I. INTRODUCTION
Sometimes Washington moves in full circles. As recently as the early 1960s, welfare as we know it was completely provided at the discretion and control of the states. ''State Public Assistance'' was predominantly a locally funded and regulated system of assisting the poor and unemployed. It was not until the mid 1960s that the Federal government ''nationalized'' welfare into two federally assisted programs, AFDC and UI, creating minimum standards and eligibility. Today, there is a move to return to at least state control, with partial federal funding through largely unrestricted block grants.
Ž . This paper develops an Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium ANE model of Ž . welfare payment choice by states and welfare recipient migration in which there is a finite migration elasticity. This yields predictions for how payment levels as well as recipient population shares will co-vary across statesᎏif states ''fear'' in-migration and welfare recipients do in fact move with respect to payment levels. The demand side of the model is quite simple, treating welfare payment levels as a pure local public good within Ž states. State governments rationally represent the interests of locationally . fixed taxpayers and fully incorporate expected in-migration into their deliberations. The movement of recipients is modeled with a finite elasticity logistic migration model, where recipients have idiosyncratic location preferences. The value of this elasticity yields different patterns of behavior across heterogeneous states and is the crucial determinant of how much states will underprovide benefits.
The predictions of the model suggest that exogenous differences in the demand to provide welfare should lead to positive correlation across states Ž in benefit levels and recipient shares e.g., increased welfare generosity . should raises both benefit payments and recipient shares . Conversely, exogenous differences across states in the supply of recipients should generate negative correlation between benefit levels and recipient shares. Of course, such comparative statics might also occur in a model where welfare recipients were locationally fixed but chose to use welfare as opposed to participating in the local labor force. An important result from the comparative static exercise in this paper is that state size greatly effects the migration elasticityᎏand hence state behavior. It is difficult to imagine that state size would play a role in a model where welfare recipients emerge from local labor force participation rather than interstate migration.
Empirically examining actual state data, a range of exogenous instruments do seem to closely match the model's predictions. Variables that arguably should shift the demand for welfare payments have significant same-sign impacts on benefit levels and recipient shares. Variables that most likely represent exogenous differences in the supply of welfare recipients have significant opposite-sign impacts on benefit levels and recipient population shares. Most importantly, larger states do provide more generous benefits and have higher recipient sharesᎏsuggesting that these impacts likely result from migration rather than labor force participation.
Furthermore:
ᎏVariables identified as demand side instruments because of their same-sign impact on benefits and recipients can be used to identify a migration elasticity. The results are remarkably robust to which instrument is used and suggest a surprisingly strong elasticity.
ᎏVariables identified as supply side instruments because of their opposite-sign impact on recipients and benefits can likewise be used to identify the demand elasticity of benefit payments with respect to the recipient share. They also turn out to be quite robust to which instrument Ž . is used and yield close to a unitary negative elasticity.
ᎏThese elasticity estimates are high enough to generate serious underprovision of welfare benefits in simulated solutions to the Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium model. These results suggest that the hypothesized concern over a ''race to the bottom'' might well be justified. A return to state provision of AFDC is likely to generate considerable inequity in how the poor are treated, and in the aggregate, lead to a significant underprovision of benefits.
II. A MULTIPLE-REGION MODEL OF WELFARE PROVISION
The model used here begins with a fixed national population of taxpayw x ers and welfare recipients. Like the model by Orr 15 ,  Taxpayers altruistically regard welfare payment levels as a pure public good within that state, and derive utility from this level as well as from residual private consumption. The budget constraint of taxpayers divides up income into private consumption and the taxes necessary to pay for welfare, which equal n p rL . With only a small share of welfare recipi-
. ents, state governments are assumed to maximize taxpayer utility Eq. 1 , Ž Ž .. which yields the first order condition Eq. 2 , when the responsiveness of the recipient population to payment levels is taken into account.
Ž . If the elasticity in 2 were the result of a local labor force participation decision, then there could in principle be no difference between the decision made by states as opposed to the nation as a whole. When the elasticity results from migration, this is not the case. At the national level, the elasticity vanishes and welfare payment levels are based only on the exogenous ratio: n rL . The higher this ratio, the higher the ''taxpayer i i Ž w x. price'' of generosity and the lower the chosen payment Orr 15 . With a Ž . mobile welfare population, the magnitude of the elasticity Ѩ n rѨ p p rn
increases the ''taxpayer price,'' and states will underprovide welfare benefits relative to a nationally made decision. A critical assumption necessary to obtain comparative static results is Ž . the specification for how the national population of welfare recipients N will be distributed among states. Recent papers by Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid w x w x 9 and Saavedra 17 have found empirical evidence of strategic behavior between spatially proximate states. The complexity introduced by such spatial autocorrelation, however, would make,it impossible to provide general equilibrium comparative statics for a fully closed model. By making the more simple assumption that distance does not matter, this paper Ž . can derive many more results. Here, it is assumed that the elasticity in 2 depends on the p and n of all states equally, and that welfare migration i i occurs with a logistic function. The ''independence of irrelevant alternatives'' feature of this function implies that the effect of one state's benefit payment on another state's recipients is the same for all states. In effect there is no proximity or distance effect among states in attracting welfare recipients. The logistic function used here further assumes that with equal payments and equal exogenous determinants, the population of recipients will distribute itself such that each state receives recipients in proportion to its Ž . taxpayer population. This formulation has welfare migrants implicitly using a hierarchical decision making process. In the first stage, a state is 2 It is of course possible to elaborate the model. One could have both a labor force participation and migration elasticity. States might also set eligibility as well as benefit levels, but both of these changes would render the model overly complex. chosen based only on payment levels, while in the second stage, ''sites'' or potential housing units are selectedᎏand assumed to be proportional to Ž . state taxpayer population. Thus the combined likelihood that a recipient Ž . 3 winds up in a state is expression 3 .
Ž . In the logistic model 3 , the parameter ␤ determines the sensitivity of the welfare population with respect to payment levels, and the elasticity Ž . Ž . Ѩ n rѨ p p rn is equal to: ␤ p 1 y n rN . The variable C represents any
exogenous shifter of supply. A distinct feature of the logistic function is that the payment elasticity increases with the number of states in the system. This feature seems quite reasonable. With ''many small states'' each easily could be inundated by raising benefits, while with a ''few large states'' this is less possible. Incorporating the logistic elasticity definition Ž . with the optimization condition 2 yields the more explicit first-order Ž . demand Eq. 4 .
In an Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium, where states are different, the Ž . right hand side of 4 depends not just on the payment level of the state Ž . making the decision, but through the variable n on the payment pattern i across other states as well. Thus if there are s states, then there are sx2 Ž . equations to be solved: s first-order conditions 4 , and s equations Ž . defining welfare recipient shares 3 . In general, the ANE solution will depend on the number of states, the variation in state characteristics, and the sensitivity of migration to payment levels.
III. COMPARATIVE STATICS

Ž .
Ž . Equations 3 and 4 form a set of two equations for each state which must be solved simultaneously for the two variables, n and p . It is schedule'' in which the recipient share determines the benefits payment. If this demand schedule is negatively sloped, then the comparative statics of the model will be just like that of any traditional ''market'' as the two schedules are exogenously shifted. Since the migration elasticity in princi-ple can depend either positively or negatively on the recipient share, the Ž . downward slope of the ''demand schedule'' is not in general assured.
Ž . With the logistic function, though, the entire RHS of 4 is in fact generally a decreasing function of n . 4 Thus with utility convexity, and the assumpi tion that both private consumption and welfare payments are ''normal'' Ž . goods, state benefit payments as determined by 4 will decrease in the number of recipients. Ž . the migration elasticity and hence RHS of 4 also increases, and the w x payment decreases QED .
In an Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium, it is possible to develop some strong results about how benefit payments and recipient shares will co-vary across states with different characteristics.
PROPOSITION 2. Ceteris paribus, states with greater taxpayer income ha¨e higher payment le¨els and welfare recipient population shares.
In a state with greater income, but the same payment, the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and local welfare altruism w Ž .x Ž . the LHS of 4 will be larger, while the RHS of 4 will be the same. Thus p must be higher to both reduce the LHS and increase the RHS. This i restores the first-order condition. Graphically, greater state income shifts the demand schedule upward. Obviously any other positive and exogenous Ž . w x demand instrument e.g., state ''generosity'' acts like income QED .
PROPOSITION 3. Ceteris paribus, larger states ha¨e higher payment le¨els and larger welfare population shares.
An important feature of the Logistic model, that would likely characterize any model which distributed welfare recipients nationally, is that state size acts like a positive demand shifter. It does this because larger states face a lower migration elasticity. Consider two otherwise identical states. If payments are equal then the larger state will have a smaller right-hand Ž . Ž . side of 4 since 1 y n rN will be smaller while n rL is the same. To If there is a positive change in C then the ''supply'' schedule shifts i upward, leading to a payment decrease while the recipient share increases w x QED .
PROPOSITION 5. In a nation with a high migration elasticity, state differences in demand will generate greater¨ariation in recipient shares and smaller differences in benefit le¨els. Con¨ersely, a lower elasticity leads to larger differences in benefits and smaller differences in recipient shares.
Ž .
As ␤ increases in 3 , not only will all states spend less, but the pattern across states will also change. States that wish to offer higher payments Ž . i.e., larger, wealthier, more generous states will find that their increased ''demand'' is thwarted by the high migration elasticity. With less elastic migration states are ''freer'' to exercise their demand preferences. Graphically, when ␤ is larger, all states face a more vertically steep supply schedule. Against this schedule, shifts in demand lead more to differences in recipient shares and less to differences in welfare payments. Conversely, in an ANE solution with very inelastic migration, states will exhibit greater variation in payment levels, with relatively little variation in recipient population shares.
IV. ACTUAL STATE WELFARE PATTERNS
Under the assumptions of the ANE modelᎏbenefits as a local public good, no taxpayer migration, and logistic recipient migrationᎏthere should Ž . exist in equilibrium quite distinct patterns in benefit payments and recipient shares across the rather diverse states than make up the Nation.
Ž . In the Appendix, actual welfare AFDC benefit levels in each state are presented along with the share of the population receiving them. The data are for 1994, the last year in a period during which federal AFDC policies had not changed much. Recipient shares range from 2 to 8%, while Ž .
5 monthly benefit levels range from $118 to $846. The question to be asked is whether the pattern across states reasonably matches the predictions of Propositions 1᎐4. 5 The benefit levels reported in the Appendix table are the maximum allowable for a family of one adult and two children. Data on the average benefit payment across all types of families was also obtained. The correlation between the two is 0.87. The data for several years prior to 1994 look virtually identical to that shown in the Appendix, suggesting that at that time the AFDC program was operating in some state of relative equilibrium.
In comparing actual welfare expenditure to that predicted by the ANE model, a number of data issues arise. The first of these involves the widespread belief that various cities and regions of the country have quite different living costs. In this case, the ANE model should be cast in ''real'' terms; y should represent real taxpayer resources and p real benefit i i payment levels. Unfortunately there still does not exist any official cross-Ž . section cost-of-living COL index. The indices available from the government only compare prices over time within an area, and are available for only a small number of MSAs, not states. The American Chamber of Commerce Research Association produces a cross-section price index for almost 300 MSAs each year. While the basis of the survey is not well documented, the index appears ''reasonable'' and is available for enough areas to create state-level indices. 6 The empirical work in this section will try to use this index and estimate equations with real as well as nominal dollar variables.
Testing the model requires also obtaining a set of instruments and being able to identify whether they operate on supply or demand. In a few instances, a strong case can be made a priori that a variable clearly influences one side of the model as opposed to another. In other instances, however, there is ambiguity and one can only ascertain ex post, whether the variable operates ''as if'' it were a demand or supply instrument. Demand side variables should have same-sign impacts on recipient shares and benefits, while supply side variable have opposite-sign impacts. With this is mind, the following variables were used as instruments.
Ž
State number of households. The ANE model together with the Logis-. tic function makes a rather strong prediction about how state size oper-Ž . ates as a demand side instrument Proposition 3 . There would seem to be little alternative explanation for why larger states should have higher recipient shares and benefit levels other than through the predicted migration elasticity effect. The impact of state size provides an important distinction between a model where the recipient elasticity results from migration rather than labor force participation.
Income and %POV. Median household income clearly operates as a Ž . demand instrument Proposition 2 . However, it can be argued that income might also act as a supply shifterᎏpoorer states have a larger fraction of their population eligible for AFDC. To handle this issue, the equations included both overall median state income as well as the fraction of households that live below the state's official poverty level. The former Ž presumably is a demand shifter while the incidence of poverty ceteris . paribus alters supply. It could be argued that this variable is only a proxy for welfare recipients and as such, is likely to be endogenous. This would be the case if most ''poor'' households are AFDC eligible and move in reaction to benefit levels. However, the state fraction of households below this threshold ranges from 10 to 27% and these shares are three to four times larger than the fraction actually receiving AFDC. Since the poverty rate and AFDC participation are quite different variables, it seems reasonable to think of a state's poverty rate as an AFDC supply shifter.
GRANT. Until the last few years, Washington provided each state with Ž . a matching grant that was directly inversely proportional to each state's per capita income. In principle, this matching grant represents an excellent demand side instrument. In practice, while the matching grant rates are toprbottom truncated, the simple correlation between these rates and state per capita income is 0.82. 7 The grant is so highly correlated with income that it may prove difficult to extract its expected significant Ž . negative ''price effect.'' DEM 88. A frequently suggested demand side variable is some measure of state generosity toward social insurance programs or political ''liberalness.'' This was ascertained by examining the fraction of state voters in recent presidential elections that voted for the acknowledged ''liberal'' Ž . usually democratic candidate. While the 1984, 1988, and 1992 elections all worked well, slightly better results were obtained with 1988. The choice between Bush and Dukakis seemed to best identify state differences in welfare preferences.
%NW. Finally a state's racial makeup was included. It is not clear Ž whether this represents a supply shifter e.g., racial predispositions toward . Ž . poverty as opposed to a demand instrument e.g., racial prejudice . The variable chosen was the fraction of the state's population that is non-white. 8 Based on longer term demographic differences between states, this variable also seems clearly exogenous and its propensity to influence demand as opposed to supply can only be estimated from its empirical effects.
With these caveats, Table 1 presents a series of reduced-form regressions predicting state welfare benefit payments and recipient shares. The equations do not represent the model's structural equations: the marginal 7 In 1994, the following formula was used to determine the state share of AFDC total expenditure: 
Ž .
i 8 Attempts to use the population fraction that was just black, or Hispanic, produced slightly fewer significant results than the combined, non-white grouping. Ž . Ž . condition 2 and migration function 3 . Rather, they simply attempt to verify the comparative static equilibrium results in Propositions 2᎐4.
Ž . In the first set of equations labeled column 1 all dollar variables are measured in nominal dollar terms with no attempt to correct for differ-Ž . ences across states in the cost-of-living COL . In the second set of equations, both benefit and income variables are ''deflated'' by the ACCRA cross-section COL. The results are quite consistent across the two different specifications.
In general, the results are remarkably consistent with the ANE model's Propositions and virtually all of the coefficients are significant statistically. State median income, population size, and ''liberalness'' all have significant and same-sign impacts on recipient shares and benefit payment levels ᎏan indication that each acts as a positive demand shifter. The only variable identified a priori as a demand shifter that does not work well is the GRANT variable. While it has the correct sign in the recipient share equation, its impact on benefits is wrong-signed. 9 These results, however, are completely insignificant. This was perhaps to be expected given the colinearity of the variable with state income.
The final two instruments, a state's poverty rate and racial mix, display Ž . all of the characteristics of positive supply shifters Proposition 4 . With a Ž . larger exogenous number of potential welfare recipients, states decide to offer lower benefit levels, although on net, the number of actual recipients is still higher. The fraction of the population that is non-white acts similarly, again raising recipient shares and reducing state benefit payments. Of these supply side effects, only the racial impact on recipient shares is not significant at the 5% level.
In Table 1 , the results have been estimated over only the 48 continental states, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. This was done for several reasons. First the non-white populations in these areas are quite high, representing the indigenous peoples of these states. This might confound the effect of racial mix that occurs in the lower 48 states. Secondly, Alaska and Hawaii Ž . are thousands of miles from other states, and the null assumption of a Ž . high migration elasticity to these remote areas seems a little unrealistic. Quite similar results were obtained with all 50 states, although the fits and significance were not quite as strong.
In sum, all of the coefficients in Table 1 for those variables that were suggested as likely demand shifters have significant same-sign impacts on state benefit levels and recipient shares. Conversely, the coefficients for those variables offered up as supply shifters have significant opposite-sign impacts on benefits and recipient shares. The empirics conform closely to the model's predictions, and state size has the exact impact it should if the recipient elasticity results from migration.
V. IDENTIFICATION OF STRUCTURAL COEFFICIENTS AND ELASTICITIES
The comparative statics of ANE model are strongly supported by the data on differences in state welfare behaviorᎏif the instruments used are assigned to the supply or demand side of the model based on the results in Table 1 . With this assignment it should be possible to estimate the model's two important structural parameters: the elasticity of recipient share in the Ž . benefit demand equation and the benefit elasticity in the recipient share Ž . supply equation. Since the model is overidentified, each of several instruments can be used and the results compared. Table 2 displays these results.
Ž The structural impact of recipient share on benefits the demand coeffi-. cient above is recovered from the ratio of two reduced form coefficients:
Ž . the coefficient of a supply recipient share instrument in the reduced form benefit equation and the coefficient of the same instrument in the reduced form recipient share equation. For the two assigned supply instruments the results are y144 with %NW, and y0.107 with the %POV. These are i i Ž The structural impact of benefit payments on recipients the supply . coefficient above also is identified from the ratio of two reduced form Ž . coefficients: the coefficient of a demand benefit payment instrument in the reduced form share equation and the coefficient of the same instrument in the reduced form benefit payment equation. With the three instruments identified as demand shifters, the results are: 0.009 for income, 0.015 for households, and 0.014 for DEM88. The range of these estimates is surprisingly tight given the very different nature of these Ž . variables. When evaluated at sample means p s $385, n rL s 4.1 these
results estimate the recipient supply elasticity between states in the 0.8 to 1.2 range. As a comparison, Table 3 reports four estimates for the pair of linear structural equations that underlie the reduced form ones in Table 1 , using the instrument assignment from the reduced form equations. These results again are exactly in accord with the ANE model, and with the exception of the GRANT variable, are highly significant. The average coefficient for recipient share is y126, which is right in the middle of those identified from the reduced form equations. The derivative of welfare recipient share with respect to benefit payments is in the 0.010 range. This again is very similar to the results recovered from the reduced form equations in Table 1 .
VI. COMPARISONS WITH PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Interestingly, there appears to be no previous study that directly attempts to estimate both supply and demand elasticities with aggregate w x state-level data. The work of Gramlich and Laren 10 estimates a demand coefficient but cannot statistically identify a migration elasticity from its single equation. Other more recent studies using aggregate data have focused on testing for strategic interaction. Positive evidence that states react to neighboring state welfare programs would at least strongly suggest w x a migration elasticity. The studies by Saavedra 17 , Figlio, Kolpin, and w x w x Reid 9 , and Shroder 18 all find significant evidence of such interactions but are not able to statistically estimate a recipient migration elasticity.
The other empirical literature that exists has focused on using micro data to directly estimate welfare mobility in reaction to benefit payments. w x The best known study is by Blank 1 . Using micro data from the CPS, Blank estimates an equation similar to the Logistic migration function described here. The probability that a welfare recipient is located in a particular region depends on the region's welfare payments in addition to regional wages and other variables. Missing, however, is any measure reflecting regional size or locational ''opportunities.'' With this model Blank estimates that a $100 decrease in monthly benefits would reduce the likelihood by about 5% that an eligible household in that region in 1975 would still be living there 4 years later.
w x In a more recent paper, Walker 20 is critical of micro studies that attempt to predict ''destinations'' or locational choice, because of the range of omitted factors that may influence those decisions. Walker examines gross migration flows between a selected sample of adjacent states with large differences in welfare payments. He also compares the Ž . gross flow rates for poor young women potential AFDC recipients to that of several other groups in the population. Walker finds little evidence that the ''high'' payment state is attracting and retaining recipients at significantly different rates from the ''low'' payment state. Levine and Zimmerw x man 11 , using NLSY data also conclude that state welfare generosity has little impact on the relative migration of those who are eligible as opposed to ineligible for benefits. w x Adding to the debate Borjas 3 argues that while native U.S. residents may be face transaction costs to relocating, immigrants from abroad overcome these, at the time of immigration. Thus Borjas hypothesizes that with greater spatial mobility, recent immigrants should have a higher elasticity of welfare participation with respect to benefit levels, and in turn should be more concentrated in higher payment states than are native residents. In comparing the spatial distribution of recent immigrants to Ž . other AFDC eligible population groups, Borjas finds that recent immigrants are far more spatially clustered. Estimating linear probability models for welfare participation, using CPS files, Borjas also finds that recent Ž . immigrants have higher AFDC participation than other eligible population groups.
VII. SIMULATED SOLUTIONS OF WELFARE UNDERPROVISION
The empirical results here are strong enough to suggest using the theoretical model to simulate the degree of underprovision that results when welfare is provided by a system of states as opposed to the nation as a whole. In the Logistic function a value of ␤ s 0.0002 gives a migration elasticity at sample means that is just slightly less than 1.0ᎏthat which was estimated econometrically. In terms of taxpayer preferences, a simple Cobb-Douglas function would yield a benefit payment elasticity of y1.0, reasonably close to the econometric estimate of y1.3. Using the utility Ž . function 5 then, and solving the first-order condition for payment level Ž .
Ž . 4 , the result is a quadratic equation with solution 6 . Only the positive Ž . root of 6 yields non-zero payment levels.
Given a set of s states, with corresponding exogenous values Y , L , C ,
␤, and ␣ there is a system of s = 2 interdependent equations to be solved i Ž . Ž . using 6 together with 3 . Clearly these cannot be solved in closed form, and so numerical examples must be simulated. An algorithm to iteratively Ž . Ž . solve 6 and 3 for any system of states is quite easy to devise. Table 4 first shows the results for a nation that contains 6 states, each with the set of characteristics shown, and a national population of 46 million. In the second frame, a nation closer to the current U.S. is simulated, with a national population of 322 million in 42 states, 7 duplicates of each of the original 6 states.
In the simulations, the expenditure share on welfare is set at 2% Ž . ␣ s 0.02 , with 5% of the national population as welfare recipients. With i Ž . a 2% expenditure share, an immobile ␤ s 0 recipient population of 5%, and average household income of $47,826, the national solution to the provision of welfare benefits is an annual payment level of $18,755. This is the true pareto level of welfare benefits when the payment is treated as a pure altruistic public good.
In the first frame of Table 4 , the value of ␤ is then set at 0.0002. With Ž . this close to unitary elasticity, there is significant underprovision of the public good, and welfare payments fall into a range that is roughly half of the national solution. It is important to remember that with only 6 states, the logistic elasticity is somewhat smaller than would occur with a nation On the supply side, the third line estimates the impact of an exogenously higher welfare population. The value of C is set to generate an exogenous i increase in welfare recipients that is equivalent to an extra $1000 dollars in yearly benefits. This state then winds up spending about 6% less, while still having 12% more recipients. With the assumed unitary migration elasticity, payment levels across all the state differ by as much as 33% while recipient shares wind up differing by 65%.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS: WELFARE UNDERPROVISION
The model used here, together with the identified elasticities, suggests that an underprovision of welfare payments could well occur with continued fiscal decentralization of the AFDC system. The degree of underprovision can be ascertained with some precision using the ANE simulation model, if one is willing to accept its assumptions: logistic migration and no labor force participation by recipients. In addition, one must accept the Ž . econometric results that yielded perhaps surprisingly strong structural elasticities. Under both of these caveats, the level of underprovision turns out to be around 60% for a nation similar to the U.S.
Of course in the real world, welfare recipients can be encouraged to work, and with this option, might be less likely to migrate as local benefits are changed. In addition, states can implement policies that more directly discourage welfare migration, such as residency requirements. Policy options like these could well ameliorate some of the impacts suggested here. Still there is enough underlying elasticity in this simple model to suggest that decentralized welfare provision might well generate some significant reductions in welfare benefits.
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